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Opinnäytetyö on jaettu kahteen osaan. Ensimmäinen osa on julkisen avaimen infrastruktuuri 
toimintamallin esittely ja toinen on toimintamallin arviointi. Opinnäytetyö vastaa kysymyk-
seen, kuinka yritys pystyy tarjoamaan tehokkaamman ja johdonmukaisemman julkisen avai-
men infrastruktuurin. Keskeinen kysymys on, kuinka yritys pystyy tunnistamaan vastapuolen 
turvallisesti. Yrityksellä tulee olla luottamus syötteisiin. 
 
Toimintamalli on rakennuttu perustuen Information Security Forumin parhaisiin käytänteisiin. 
Toimintamalli on rakennettu finanssialan yrityksen tarpeisiin. Finanssiala on eniten säännöksiä 
omaavampia aloja ja vaatimukset ovat kovia. Korkeiden kriteereiden vuoksi mallin implemen-
tointi tulisi olla mahdollista myös muille toimialoille. Toimintamalli on rakennettu perustuen 
useisiin standardeihin ja parhaisiin käytänteisiin. 
 
Arviointiosio perustuu finanssialan Julkisen avaimen infrastruktuuri -projektiin. Projekti on 
osaprojekti Yhtenäinen euromaksualueen muutos -projektista. Julkisen avaimen infrastruk-
tuuri -projekti kestää yli kolme vuotta ja se hyödyntää kaikkia toimintamallin osa-alueita. 
Tämän takia malliprojekti on optimaalinen arvioimaan Julkisen avaimen infrastruktuuri -
toimintamallia. Mallin arvioinnin tulisi vastata kysymykseen, onko toimintamalli hyödynnettä-
vissä ja voidaanko toimintamalli implementoida muihin ympäristöihin? 
 
Opinnäytetyössä käytetään suunnittelututkimuksen metodia. Suunnittelututkimuksella on 
kaksi aktiviteettiä: rakenna ja arvioi. Ilmentymä rakennetaan, koska halutaan kuvata miten se 
oikeasti toimii. Opinnäytetyön ilmentymä on Julkisen avaimen infrastruktuuri -toimintamalli. 
Rakentaminen on prosessi, jolla luodaan ilmentymä tiettyyn tarkoitukseen. Arviointi on pro-
sessi, joka tarkastelee, miten hyvin ilmentymä toimii. Arvioinnin kriteerit pitää määritellä. 
Ilmentymän rakennusvaiheessa toimintaa ei välttämättä vielä ymmärretä kovin hyvin, vaan 
vasta arviointivaiheessa voidaan saada selkeä kuva tutkittavasta aiheesta.  
 
Opinnäytetyön tuloksista on kehitetty ilmentymä Julkisen avaimen infrastruktuuri -
toimintamallista. Tämä toimintamalli antaa ensimmäiset askeleet siitä, mitä tulee tehdä Jul-
kisen avaimen infrastruktuuri -projektissa. Tämä toimintamalli antaa osittain vastauksia ky-
symykseen, kuinka kehittää tehokkaammin, halvemmin ja turvallisemmin Julkisen avaimen 
infrastruktuuri -palveluita. Tulokset ovat oikeasta julkisen avaimen infrastruktuuri projektista 
ja ne ovat vertailtavissa muihin projekteihin. 
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My thesis is divided in two parts. The first part deals with the Public Key Infrastructure opera-
tions model and the second offers an evaluation of that model. The thesis answers how to 
provide efficiency and consistent Public Key Infrastructure functionality to a company. The 
main question is how a company can identify the counterparty player securely. A company 
must be able to trust outputs and inputs. 
 
The model is based on Information Security Forum best practices and it is built for the com-
panies in the financial sector. Being one of the most regulated sectors, the requirements are 
set high. This is the reason why the model should have possibilities for easy implementation 
implement to other environments. Model built on multiple standards and best practices. 
 
The evaluation phase is grounded on the financial sector Public Key Infrastructure project. 
This project is part of Single Euro Payments Area financial changes. The project length ex-
ceeds three years, and it uses all model phases. For this reason the company Public Key Infra-
structure project is optimal for evaluating the Public Key Infrastructure operations model. 
Model evaluating should answer on whether the model is usable and it be implemented to 
other environments. 
 
This thesis relies on the Design research method, the final product being the Public Key Infra-
structure operations model. Design science contains two principle activities: build and eva-
luate. Building the artifact demonstrates how it works. In this study building means the 
process of constructing the actual artifact, the Public Key Infrastructure operations model. 
Evaluation, for its part, is the process of terming how well the artifact works. Specific criteria 
must be set up for successful evaluation.  This mean that when to build artifact as Public Key 
Infrastructure operations model so functioning may not be well understood. 
  
The thesis result is the artifact of Public Key Infrastructure operations model. This model 
offers the first steps on what must be done in the Public Key Infrastructure project. It pro-
vides a partial answer on how to develop faster, more efficient, and safer Public Key Infra-
structure services. The thesis results are derived from a real Public Key Infrastructure 
project, but these kinds of projects are comparable with one another. 
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1 Introduction 
 
This thesis is a review of public key infrastructure operations model. The thesis discussion 
begins from business needs and ends with support and maintenance. It asks what users should 
take into consideration in the public key infrastructure project? Thesis model is build to a 
financial company and that model is based on known security forum solution. Thesis result is 
evaluated public key infrastructure model. Thesis knowledge base is known reliable sources 
and company own PKI project lesson and learns results. Thesis uses a design science research 
method. 
 
Confidentiality, integrity, availability and non-repudiation are what companies want for ser-
vices. PKI (public key infrastructure) offers one solution. PKI is based on trust. All parties 
must be able trust each other. Most common way to use PKI is internet browsers certificates 
user or service identification certifications. As such PKI is not a new solution to the secure 
networks and users. The first finding of secure communications messages dates back to year 
1949. Shannon defines the need as ―secrecy systems where the meaning of the message is 
concealed by cipher, code, etc., although its existence is not hidden, and the enemy is as-
sumed to have any special equipment necessary to intercept and record the transmitted sig-
nal.‖ (1949. 1). Later, in 1973, Feistel noted that computer lines are open to corruption of 
traffic. Therefore, data secrecy must provide adequate protection against operational decep-
tion of the system. (1973. 1) 
 
PKI can be used in all situations where confidentiality, integrity, availability and non-
repudiation services are needed. It is applicable for securing VPN (Virtual Private Network) 
connections or identifying the system user. Other solutions include web security like server 
authentication or client authentication. One of the user applications is email encrypting. This 
means that sharing digital signatures so that mails have confidentiality between messages. 
PKI can be use also to encrypt file systems. Smart card authentication is normally bases on 
PKI environment. These are used for web applications and operate system authentications. 
One of the consumer services in Finland is the mobile certificate. The Finnish mobile certifi-
cate is an electronic identification document that the user can exploit in a mobile phone. The 
personal certificate is built-in in the SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) card. (Mobile certificate 
2011.) An older, yet widely used, solution is the TUPAS (Identification Service for Service 
Providers). Banks identify their customers by applying the same bank-specific identifiers that 
the customer uses in the bank’s individual services. The TUPAS service is typically used in 
Internet services. TUPAS as such is not directly related to this thesis, but it is a common sys-
tem in the financial sector (Federation of Finnish Financial Services. 2011. 4) 
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PKI is used frequently in different environments. Because of its common use criminal ele-
ments have shown plenty of interest toward it. Normally this is noticed in identity thefts. PKI 
service providers also qualify as criminal targets because of their active use. Latest criminal 
acts include the RSA (Coviello 2011), compromised Diginor certificates (Interim Report 2011) 
and Beast, where transport layer security was compromised (Cert-fi). Cases are more pre-
pared and pointed to certain system or environment. Case Comodo is an example for that. 
―The attacker was well prepared and knew in advance what he was to try to achieve. He 
seemed to have a list of targets that he knew he wanted to obtain certificates for, was able 
quickly to generate the CSRs for these certificates and submit the orders to our system so 
that the certificates would be produced and made available to him.‖ (Comodo incident report 
2011) In 2012 the world’s largest SSL (secure socket layer) certificate issuing authority Veri-
sign faced several successful attacks against its corporate network. The purpose of the at-
tacks was to access computers and servers and to get secure information. (Keizer, B. 2012.)  
 
Authorities and governments grant standards, best practices and laws telling what companies 
should do? Best known standards or best practices are the NIST (National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology), ISO (International Organization for Standardization), ITIL (Information 
Technology Infrastructure Library), COBIT (Control OBjectives for IT) and PCI (payment card 
industry). The Owner of the PCI standard is PCI Security Standards Council. At least PCI stan-
dards have two different areas where to use PKI. In the first one all sensitive information 
must be encrypted during transmission over networks (PCI Security Standards Council LLC. 
2010.35). Second is to make sure that all persons have unique identification (PCI Security 
Standards Council LLC. 2008.46). Companies are required to use standards and best practices 
in the contract level. Laws HIPAA (the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) 
and SOX (the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) define how to use authentication like PKI. 
 
Finnish government money laundry act sets requirements to financial companies. Acts define 
that the company must identify the customer’s identity with strong authentication (Ministry 
of the Interior. 2008). Act on Electronic Signatures defines ―the operations of a certification 
service provider providing qualified certificates to the public shall be careful, reliable and 
appropriate and non-discriminatory towards its customers. The certification service provider 
shall have technical expertise and financial resources sufficient vis-á-vis the scope of opera-
tions. The certification service provider shall be liable for all aspects of the certification op-
erations, including the reliability and functionality of any services and products produced by 
parties assisting the certification service provider.‖ (Ministry of the Interior. 2003) 
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2 Research Problem 
 
My main research problems deal with the following dilemmas: what a user should take into 
consideration in a public key infrastructure project and how to make sure that the company 
has a secure, efficient, and consistent PKI solution. Companies have started to use PKI solu-
tions in several environments. Confidentiality, integrity, availability and non-repudiation are 
the principal concerns in the banking or healthcare environment. The question is how to satis-
fy business demands? How companies can be sure of the reliability of the counterparty player? 
How any company employer can be sure where the mail comes from without a reliable certi-
fication? There has to exist some way how to trust intercompany connections and mails? 
 
The financial sector started using data communication connections around 1980. Now almost 
all communication between customers and financial companies takes place by using data 
communication. Data communication means bank cash machines, bank to bank communica-
tion, bank to customer connections, or different payment channels like e-invoice. Bank to 
bank communication operates in closed Swift network. (Kontkanen 2008. 187) The develop-
ment in financial payments sector has been very active in recent years because of SEPA (Sin-
gle Euro Payments Area). This new development has changed some of the quintessential pay-
ment channels and the overall operational structures. There are these days more rules and 
more banks in critical clearing cycles. SEPA has also changed data transfer methods and en-
cryption issues. 
 
The main concern is how to provide a systematic progression to handle all PKI project factors. 
In some cases it is important that all factors are processed. A telling example is that a com-
pany builds their own infrastructure but they do not check their own certification usability. In 
the Cross certification cases counterparty policy set usability to company certifications. 
These include well known public services like VeriSign. That is one of the reasons why cross 
certification research work must be done. 
 
Outsourcing is another case. Companies must investigate what kinds of regulators are in-
volved in the use PKI environment. For example, some laws must be followed, or there might 
exist some national regulators like Federation of Finnish Financial Services. There is a world-
wide service provider VISA. VISA drive companies to use PCI Security Standards Council stan-
dard. Large companies might have their own policy what must be followed. 
 
Common PKI environments are typically audited regularly or annually. There are a number of 
auditing guides that describe the PKI rules a company should follow. Finnish national security 
auditing criteria reads that ―Secret keys are only in use for authorized users and processes. 
Processes and procedures for key management are documented and appropriately imple-
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mented.‖ (Ministry of Defence. 2011. 88). Another audit framework is the COBIT (Control 
OBjectives for IT). COBIT define in DS5 (deliver and support phase 5) security cryptographic 
key management as follows: ―Determine that policies and procedures are in place to organize 
the generation, change, revocation, destruction, distribution, certification, storage, entry, 
use and archiving of cryptographic keys to ensure the protection of keys against modification 
and unauthorized disclosure.‖ (The IT Governance Institute. 2001. 118) 
 
The European Commission outlines that internet users must be safe and secure when they 
connect online. In EC’s thinking it is as if the user was functioning in the physical world. Cy-
bercrime cannot be tolerated. Electronic banking or Health would not exist if new technolo-
gies proved unreliable. The world, however, is experiencing a growing epidemic in identity 
theft and online fraud. Attacks are becoming increasingly sophisticated and often motivated 
by financial or political purposes. (European Commission. 2010. 16) 
 
Every project has a definite beginning and a definite end (PMBOK guide 2004. 5). It is vital 
that there exists a timetable for when the PKI environment must be ready. Normally the PKI 
environment is part of some large project. For example, when a company adds a new connec-
tion to the new environment by Web service to save connection and file transfer, it needs a 
working PKI environment. A PKI project contains numerous vital stages, like the technique 
and the corporate stage. Technique stage involves building up the environment, while the 
corporate stage deals more with handling agreements and certificate policies between the 
individual company, customer, and PKI environment provider. As they progress, the projects 
typically outline improved processes. In some cases new process development starts before 
the actual project has even ended. 
 
The project opportunity window is usually temporary (PMBOK guide 2004. 6). A PKI project 
must use this. Afterwards it is more difficult to get funding and resources to the development 
of the project. PKI environment is normally part of larger development project. It is quite 
commonplace that the company that owns the project does not have PKI knowledge. That is 
the main reason why it should use outside knowledge. The question is how a company can 
follow what must be done without the necessary knowledge. For these cases a company needs 
a model list of best practices to follow. 
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A Guide to the project management body of knowledge defines that project activities cannot 
be normal activities (2004. 7).  Guide also defines strategic considerations (2004. 7): 
- Market demand 
- Organizational need 
- Customer request 
- Technological advance 
- legal requirements 
 
There could be a future market demand for PKI in mobile certification for the private cus-
tomers. An example for Organizational need PKI could be the need to provide secure trans-
missions between own and outsourced systems. Corporate customer PKI requests could be 
policy requirements for transmissions between customers to the company. In some cases 
technological advance gives the company more secure or easier way to provide PKI environ-
ment services to customers or company’s own processes. Governments or commercial authori-
ties like the PCI actor force the company to use a specific PKI solution so the company can 
operate within the parameters of laws and regulations. 
 
Information security projects like the PKI project typically establish new technologies and 
processes. In selecting new technologies there exists a need for wide scale experience so all 
the aspects are valid. Latest but unknown the solution is not attractive to the project group. 
The company personnel require specific training when facing a new subject. This increases 
the risk of human resources turnover because new skills might be desired in other companies. 
(Mattord & Whitman 2010. 20) 
 
Factors what must be solved in the PKI project: 
- Requirements 
- Infrastructure 
- Trust model and cross certification  
- Standards 
- Scalability 
- Performance and offline behavior 
- Technology decision 
- Outsourcing 
- Security 
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2.1 Project 
 
My thesis focuses on the financial sector operational environment, which is one of the most 
regulated professional sectors with high requirements. This PKI model is based on identified 
financial sector requirements. It focuses specifically on banking and on one of the core ser-
vices in the banking sector, financial transmission (Kontkanen 2008. 12). Transmissions take 
place between banks or customers. Customers are corporate customers.  
 
The reference project is related to the financial sector data transfers. Situation was that a 
financial company needed a new channel with PKI verification. The channel solution was new 
so all PKI work began as a business case. This was an optimal project for this thesis because it 
uses all steps of the operations model. PKI solution is replacing old PATU model. The PATU 
security model is the base on the DES (Data Encryption Standard) keys. Three keys in use are 
the HSK (The Hashing Key), AUK (The Authentication Key) and KEK (The Key Exchange Key). 
Transmission parties share their own copies of the keys. The customer must set keys for each 
bank, and the bank must set keys for each of its customers. (The Finnish bankers’ association 
- Information security committee 2001. 6) 
 
The project requirements for the PKI part were defined by a coalition of financial companies. 
Specifications defined that the PKI must use a X.509v3 standard certification. Certification is 
used for two logically different purposes. First: to authenticate the party that generated the 
signed data. Second: to ensure that the signed data has not been modified in transit. Specifi-
cation excludes PKI generation, distribution, administration and use. (Nordea, OP-Pohjola 
Group, Sampo Bank 2008) 
 
This project is part of larger financial payment transformation which has started from the 
SEPA (Single Euro Payments Area) changes. Citizens of the European Union can make pay-
ments in 32 countries using the same specification to build up transactions. The European 
Payments Council (EPC) defines the SEPA payment schemes and frameworks. EPC has an im-
pact on security requirements. (European Payments Council. SEPA visions and goals) 
 
2.2 Public key infrastructure 
 
In 1976 Diffie, Hellman and Merkle developed public key cryptography, next year Rivest, 
Shamir and Adleman conceived the RSA algorithm, while the year after that Lohnfelder in-
vented the certificate. Latest specification of certifications dates to 1999 when Internet PKI 
certificate and CRL (certificate revocation list) profile RFC2459 (Request for Comments) and 
Internet PKI certificate policy and certification practices framework RFC2527 IETF (The Inter-
net Engineering Task Force) documents were published. (Housley, R & Polk, T. 2001. 2)   
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Components of the PKI are CA (Certification Authority), CRL (Certificate revocation list), Re-
pository, RA (Registration authority), and archive and Infrastructure users. The CA represents 
a combination of computer hardware, software and operative users. First CA function is to 
create and sign certificates. Second is to maintain certificate status information. Next is to 
publish current certifications and CRLs. Fourth, and the final one, is to maintain archives 
status. (Housley, R & Polk, T. 2001. 44) 
 
The CA can issue certificates to users or other CAs. When CA issues certificate it issues public 
and private corresponds. The CA inserts name to certification so users can easily identify it. 
Users verify signature by using CA’s public key to ensure that the certification is valid. Private 
Key tells CA name and after verification trusts that private key. This is the reason why the 
user must protect the private key. (Housley, R & Polk, T. 2001. 45) 
The CA must update CLR list so certifications statuses are updated. Protecting these statuses 
is similar to protecting the certificate profile. The CA is only useful when the certificates and 
CRL lists generates are available to the users. The CA certification and CRL are public so 
there is no security issue when CA publishes these. Only the private key must be secured. The 
CA must maintain information so as to identify the signer of an old document based on an 
expired document. Also revocation information must include that information. CA can build 
up audit trail of all actions so all known steps are easier to follow. This is a common attribute 
but not usually used. (Housley, R & Polk, T. 2001. 46) 
 
The image below demonstrates the relationship between entities defined in terms of the PKI 
management processes. The letters point out PKI management messages.  (Adams C. & Farrell 
S. 1999. 5) 
 
14 
 
 
cert / CRL 
repository
End Entity
RA
CA
CA 2
PKI "USERS"
PKI MANAGEMENT 
ENTITIES
cert. publish
Cert. publish
cert. publish
CRL publish
initial registration/ 
certification key pair 
recovery key pair update 
certificate update 
revocation request 
"out-of-band" loading
"out-of-band" publication
cross-certification
cross-certificate update
g j
a b
a b
g
g
h
c
d
e f
i
a
b
 
 
Figure 1 PKI Certificate Management Protocols  
(Adams C. & Farrell S. 1999. 6) 
 
The main purpose of the RA is to verify certificate content for the CA. The RA functions as a 
link between the customer and the CA and performs information verifications before the first 
key par is transferred to the customer. In some cases the RA can publish certifications by 
itself if they have access to the CA environment. A Repository system distributes certificates 
and CRLs. A repository accepts certificates and CRLs from CAs to several different security 
services. Archive is responsible for long term CA information storage. Data is loaded to arc-
hive but after that archive data remains static. (Housley, R & Polk, T. 2001. 49) 
 
There are three different solutions for PKI architecture. First is simple architecture. The sim-
ple architecture is straightforward. There is one trusted CA and one CRL for certification vali-
dation. There can be several certifications. There are no relationships to other CAs. (Housley, 
R & Polk, T. 2001. 54)  
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Figure 2 Simple architectures 
 
 
The Enterprise architecture is more complex. There is one trusted root CA but there can sev-
eral subordinate CAs. All users trust the same central root CA. The Enterprise solution certifi-
cation paths are easy to update because every CA has a specific master CA. In the case the 
certificate is compromised it is easier to update because the certificate is relaying only on 
that one CA. But if Root CA is compromised all certification and CA must be revoked. (Hous-
ley, R & Polk, T. 2001. 57) 
 
USER A
CA
USER B USER A
CA
USER B
Root CA
 
Figure 3 Enterprise architectures 
 
The Hybrid architecture is combination of Simple and Enterprise architectures. A common 
way is to build peer-to-peer connections between CAs. All Certifications must use same ac-
cepted policies and practices. It is more complicated to  build a new certification but this 
guarantees that the secure path is trusted. And this forces CAs to inform right way if CA is 
compromised. One solution is Bridge CA. In the Bridge solution there is only one CA where 
parities are trusted. Connection solution is peer-to-peer. All Contacted CAs must follow 
Bridge CA rules. (Housley, R & Polk, T. 2001. 65) 
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Figure 4 Hybrid architectures 
 
X.509 Certificates has three components. The first component is the tamper–evident 
envelope. The digital signature provides the tamper—evident wrapper. Inside the envelope 
there is the basic certificate content. The basic certificate content includes the information 
that must be present in every certificate. The basic certificate content may include an op-
tional set of certificate extensions. This component contains optional information. 
 
The ideal certificate: (Housley, R & Polk, T. 2001. 21) 
- It would be a purely digital object, so it could be distributed over the internet and 
processed automatically.  
- It would contain the name of the user who holds the private key, identify the user’s 
company or organization and include contact information. 
- It would be easy to determine if the certificate was issued recently. 
- It would be created by a trusted party rather than user who holds the private key. 
- Since the trusted party might create a lot of certificates, even for same user, it 
should be easy to tell them apart. 
- It would be easy to determine if the ideal certificate were genuine or forged.  
- It would be tamper-proof so on one could change its contents. 
- We could immediately determine if the information on our ideal certificate is no 
longer current. 
- We could determine from the certificate the applications to which it applies. 
  
The optional version field describes the syntax of the certificates. The serial number is an 
integer assigned by the certificate issuer to each certificate. The signature field is an algo-
rithm identifier. The issuer field contains the X.500 distinguished name of the certificate is-
suer. The validity field has two components, indicating the dates on which the certificate 
becomes valid and the date on which the certificate expires. (Housley, R & Polk, T. 2001. 74) 
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Figure 5 X.509 certificate structure 
(Housley, R & Polk, T. 2001. 75) 
 
The subject field includes name of the holder of the private key. The subject public key in-
formation field contains the subject’s public key and algorithm identifier. The issuer unique 
ID and subject unique ID fields contain identifies and they only appear in versions 2 or 3 cer-
tificates. The extension field is used only in version 3 certificates. This field contains one or 
more extensions. The signature algorithm filed contains an algorithm identifier and it identi-
fies the digital signature algorithm used by the certificate issuer to sing the certificate. The 
signature value field contains the digital signature. (Housley, R & Polk, T. 2001. 78) 
 
The PKI is used in applications like S/MIME (Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions), 
TLS (transport Protocol Security) and IPsec (Internet Protocol Security). S/MIME version three 
offer protection for electronic mail. Certification can be used for digital sings and encryption. 
User can recognize the sender and the mail message is secure. TLS offer authentication and 
encryption for a communication stream. If both ends are forced to use LTS streams messages 
are protected. IPsec offers also authentication and encryption for individual datagram. Ipsec 
uses network layer three. This is a normally used firewall in an outside connection. (Housley, 
R & Polk, T. 2001. 199) 
 
Key management lifecycle can be divided to four different stages. Each stage has its own 
functions. With functions management know the stage status about the functions. First stage 
is Pre-operational stage. Key material is not ready but some keys might be in pre-activation 
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stage. This stage system and enterprise is being built. Second is the operational stage. This 
means that keys are in normal use and active. Third is the post-operational stage. Keys are 
not in active use anymore. Company still has access to the key environment and some case 
keys can be used. Keys are compromised state. Last stage is destroyed. Keys are not active 
anymore and not usable. All information about the keys is deleted. Figure 6 Key management 
states and phases. (Barker, E., Barker, W., Burr ,W. & Polk ,W. and Smid, M. 2007. 89) 
 
Pre-Activation
Active
(Protect Only
Process Only
Protect and Process)
Deactivated
(Process Only)
Destroyed Destroyed
Compromised
Compromised
(process only)
Pre-Operational Phase
Operational Phase
Post-Operational Phase
Destroyed Phase
 
Figure 6 Key management states and phases.  
(Barker, E., Barker, W., Burr ,W. & Polk ,W. and Smid, M. 2007. 91) 
 
3 Method 
 
Hevner and Chatterjee write (2010, 5) that design science research is a research paradigm in 
which a designer answers questions relevant to human problems via the creation of innovative 
artifacts. Results contribute new knowledge. Hevner (2010, 5) also mentions that designed 
artifacts are useful and basic in understanding environment. The fundamental principle of 
design science research is that knowledge and understanding of a design problem and its solu-
tion are acquired in the building and application of an artifact. ―Information systems are im-
plemented within an organization for the purpose of improving the effectiveness and efficien-
cy of that organization.‖ (Hevner, A., March, S., Park, J. & Ram, S. 2004. 76) Design science 
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results offer common design knowledge although the professional problem is always unique 
and prescribed (Järvinen, P. & Järvinen A. 2004. 104). ―Research producing field-tested and 
grounded technological rules differs in several respects from description-driven research‖ 
(Van Aken, J. 2004. 231) 
 
In this study the artifact is the Public Key Infrastructure operations model. Design science has 
two activities: build and evaluate. Artifact is built because that demonstrates how it works. 
Building is a process of constructing an artifact for a specific purpose like Public Key Infra-
structure operations model. Evaluation is the process of determining how well the artifact 
works and specific criteria must be set up for meaningful evaluation. This also means that 
when building an artifact like the PKI its operations might be misunderstood. Without under-
standing the environment the result can be poorly designed in relation to the artifact or the 
artifact result could have side-effects. When building the artifact these factors must be taken 
in to consider. (March, S. and Smith, F. 1995.258) 
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Environment IS Research
Knowledge 
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Business
Needs
Applicable
KnowledgeAssess Refine
 
Figure 7 Information Systems Research Framework  
(Hevner, A., March, S., Park, J. & Ram, S. 2004. 80) 
 
System development is divided into two main complementary parts: design and behavioral 
science. Knowledge base is in the design science and the environment is in the behavioral 
science. Design science paradigm helps develop the artifact so that it can be tested with the 
behavioral science paradigm. The research goal of behavioral sciences is the truth and in de-
sign science research aims for utility. This system development knowledge base provides ma-
terial to business needs in research. The artifacts are specialized constructs, models, me-
thods, and instantiations. The knowledge base is the foundation of methodologies like foun-
dational theories, frameworks, instruments, constructs, models, methods and instantiations. 
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Methodologies are guidelines for evaluating results. ―Design science research results are codi-
fied in the knowledge base, they become best practice.‖ (Hevner, A., March, S., Park, J. & 
Ram, S. 2004. 81.) 
 
Hevner defines seven guidelines for understanding information systems research and a clear 
set of rules or principles proscribed for conducting and evaluating good design science re-
search. (Hevner, A., March, S., Park, J. & Ram, S. 2004. 83) 
 
Design as an Artifact Design science research must produce a via-
ble artifact in the form of a construct, a 
model, a method, or an instantiation 
Problem relevance The objective of design science research is to 
develop technology-based solutions to impor-
tant and relevant business problems 
Design evaluation The utility, quality, and efficacy of a design 
artifact must be rigorously demonstrated via 
well-executed evaluation methods 
Research contributions Effective design science research must pro-
vide clear and verifiable contributions in the 
areas of the design artifact, design founda-
tions, and/or design methodologies 
Research rigor Design science research relies upon the ap-
plication of rigorous methods in both the 
construction and evaluation of the design 
artifact 
Design as a search process The search for an effective artifact requires 
utilizing available means to reach desired 
ends while satisfying laws in the problem 
environment  
Communication of research Design science research must be presented 
effectively to both technology-oriented and 
management-oriented audiences 
Figure 8 Design-Science Research Guidelines  
(Hevner, A., March, S., Park, J. & Ram, S. 2004. 83) 
 
This thesis use Design science research guidelines to produce research results. Thesis research 
develops an artifact that is the Public Key Infrastructure operations model. Problem descrip-
tion is how to develop more time, money and a secure way Public Key Infrastructure services. 
This work is evaluated in real Public Key Infrastructure project. Comparing Public Key Infra-
structure model and project research offers result of what is working and what must be de-
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velop in future research projects. This thesis should give new information on how Public Key 
Infrastructure service ought to be built. This paper uses Public Key Infrastructure and security 
standards and best practices for comparing results. Thesis takes the company project point of 
view to the results. The results are reported in this public work where all specialists can eva-
luate them. 
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4 Public Key Infrastructure operations model 
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Figure 9 Public Key Infrastructure operations model 
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Public Key Infrastructure operations model idea is based on ISF (Information Security Forum) 
best practices and modified for a financial company. The model idea is that it serves as a 
basic package to new PKI projects. The model is divided to 16 different processes. All these 
processes have their own role and owners. Process owners have divided to four different 
roles. Sometimes process significance might be trivial, other times the process might prove 
vital for the project. Good example is the Policy and standard process. First time a company 
must build this document, it might be a large undertaking for company. However, in next 
project this process is only applied for updating valid policies. 
 
Everything starts from a business case. It is important that the business part is leading this 
conversation. IT management and Risk management is supporting this report. This is an im-
portant phase because it is here that most of the metrics are defined. In the end these me-
trics define how successful the project was. Model is PKI project best practices. This is the 
reason why all processes are described separate processes. All phases give advice on what 
must be done and what should be done. In the end it’s always a company or project decision 
what to do in the different kind of PKI projects. This is not a model for how to run a PKI 
project. It does not concern with how to come up with a project budget, or how to keep 
project meetings. When a certain project adapts this model it assumes that all basic project 
process practices are defined beforehand. Normally companies have their own project model 
what they follow or they can follow PMBOK defined model appendix 1. 
 
4.1 Business Case 
 
Companies should search different options for solution in the analysis phase. All options 
should have their own cost estimate. Cost estimate must be built up for the current environ-
ment situation in the Cost estimate phase and it must have the same elements and be based 
on identical assumptions. Company should identify each solution benefit in the benefit phase. 
Result of research must be quantitative if it’s possible. Project risks must be identified in the 
project risk analysis phase. This phase has eight risk categories: Organizational and change 
management risk, business risk, information risk, technology risk, strategic risk, security risk, 
privacy risk, and project resources risk. These risks might include cost overruns, schedule 
problems, vendor problems and privacy details. All risks must be evaluated and the company 
must have practical solutions for each risk so it has risk-adjusted costs for each solution. Last 
phase is to evaluate solutions and rank each on cost, benefit and risk order. (National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology 800-35. 2003. 4-9) 
 
The Business case phase must consider what kind of business problems new PKI solution caus-
es. All business processes must be evaluated. Evaluate effects for processes. Cost framework 
must be designed. There is the implementation cost and operation cost. Company must con-
sider also goals. What new PKI solution gives now and in the future? Also it must consider 
24 
 
 
benefits like new market, supporting old functions, reduce cost, and increase sales. Company 
must set detailed plan if the new PKI solution does not work like it was planned. Also it must 
do a detail impact analysis on existing technical and business environments. The customer or 
user perspective must be solved also. Company must consider new education and awareness 
program. Also, all needed PKI skills must be listed so all education costs are visible. 
 
New PKI project might have open issues in requirements. PKI solution is used for the new 
technology so it is important to use defined standards. Normally some integration and devel-
opment is needed. This must be taken into consideration because normally this means work 
load to company’s own resources. Business case must consider up level situation CA and RA 
are compromised. Company must research similar cases from public databases for the best 
practices. These might give better picture for upcoming projects than own estimates. It is 
important for the projects that stakeholder expectations are defined. So results are easier to 
review. Business case must research all legal issues. Also there might be some outside author-
ities for the different branches’ own regulators to follow. 
 
Company should consider a pilot project. It should be done in large scale so all company areas 
have the possibility to give comments. Pilot project must be light for company. Pilot lowers 
risks and gives better cost estimate. Also this exposes all fundamental issues like certification 
usability. This also gives better suggestions how to handle PKI environment in different ways. 
 
4.2 Analysis of technical requirements 
 
Company must investigate to technical requirements. Investigate phase company can use best 
practices how to validate environments. These give good guidelines what areas company must 
consider. First is ISO (International Organization for Standardization) 27000 series of stan-
dards. ISO 27001 controls are usable. Second is PCI DSS version 1.2 requirements. At least 
company must consider these details: 
 
- Environment location 
- Hardware combination 
- Other hardware services 
- Disaster recovery 
- Hardware security 
- Hardware scalability 
- Hardware operating system 
- PKI software (open or licensed software) 
- Hardware limitation (example web service window) 
- Web client software 
- Auditing possibility 
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- Known weaknesses 
 
Company must build own key management planning document. This document describes the 
management of all key management products and services used by a PKI product. This docu-
ment is valid for the entire PKI lifecycle. One part of this document is the key management 
infrastructure. The purpose of this document is to ensure that key management services are 
supportable, available and secure. Specification must follow the organization’s resources and 
technical environment. Especially organization physical protection facilities, security clear-
ances for support personnel and procedures managing cryptographic material must be regu-
lated. The planning process must define critical resources. (Barker, E., Barker, W., Burr ,W. & 
Polk ,W. and Smid, M. 2002. 44) 
 
Key management planning must be tailored according to scope. There are differences be-
tween limited email security and full scale network securing projects. This work must be cost 
effective. The projects must always research all security steps. Good example for this kind of 
security checklist is NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) Special Publication 
800-57 checklist (Appendix 2). Some basic steps must be documented always. The key man-
agement product and service requirements must be described. These are types, quantities, 
lifetime and algorithms. Also additional information must be defined. Examples X.509 certifi-
cate standard class must be determined. NIST have steps how to define what company need 
from environment: 
(Barker, E., Barker, W., Burr ,W. & Polk ,W. and Smid, M. 2002. 44)       
 
- The types of key management products and services 
- List of key management products and services requirements 
- The projected quantity of devices to be employed in the application 
- The keying material formats 
- Lifecycle 
- PKI certificate classes 
- Tokens or software modules 
- Time table when certification are needed 
- Project timetable when resources are needed 
- Responsible person 
 
Company must understand what requirement PKI needs. This work must be done before any 
technical decisions. Most important is that business need and model is ready. For example, 
for the environment effective factor is what kind of purpose certificates are planning to use. 
One such factor is whether a certification is to be used only internally or will it be applied 
externally as Important is also the number of certificates now and in the future. Active envi-
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ronments must be evaluated also. There might be some similarities so the company may save 
in expenses. 
 
4.3 Governance support 
 
COBIT define Enterprise governance ―It is a set of responsibilities and practices exercised by 
the board and executive management.‖(COBIT Foundation 4.1. 2010. 28) COBIT also define IT 
governance ―it is part of enterprise governance. It is defined as a structure of relationships 
and processes to direct and control the enterprise toward achieving its goals by adding value 
while balancing risk versus return over IT and its processes.‖(COBIT Foundation 4.1. 2010. 29) 
Good communication with the wider organization is required to maintain support for the 
project. This is especially important when dealing with the inevitable difficulties that face 
any significant systems integration project. 
 
Governance is about performance and conformance. Performance is improving profitability, 
efficiency, effectiveness, and growth. Conformance is adhering to legislation, internal poli-
cies and contractual requirements. (COBIT Foundation 4.1. 2010. 30) Senior management 
support is needed, specifically a senior manager who supports the project and is prepared to 
support it through any difficulties encountered during its lifetime. Having good senior man-
agement support also helps to open up essential channels of communication across the organ-
ization. 
 
Senior managers should be made fully aware of the potential risks in PKI projects and user 
groups should be informed of what PKI will deliver, how it will work, and what benefits they 
can expect. One way is to compose enlisting very visible high-level support for the project 
Also project must create steering committee consisting of persons across the company. Ade-
quate time for public announcements is needed so project stays locked in the minds of the 
company personnel. Key people for the project must be kept informed of its status. These 
kinds of functions are RA, CA legal department, personnel, physical security, and support. 
 
4.4 Business impact 
 
Typically business impact cost is divided into four different cost sections, the first being 
project management and operational and maintenance support costs. Next are hardware and 
software costs which form the basis of the PKI. Third is training costs, external consultant 
services and security audits. Last are legal and policy requirements. Company must consider 
how key areas are impacted. With new environment there might become new channels to 
market or some process can be automated because of better security. There might be some 
changes to desktops or mobile equipment. Also some network might come. Certificate han-
dling might change. There might become new certification processes. This affects also CRL 
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and policy performance. Last are end user changes. For example, this might affect remote 
access connection processes or authentication methods like single sing on. 
 
All actors, including business partners, customers and other vendors, must be informed of 
these changes. These actors must be fully briefed and provided documentation about the 
changes and how the changes affect them. Also own education and awareness events and 
senior management consultation should be arranged. They management and company person-
nel also need detailed information on what has changed. In security changes there is always a 
risk on one’s reputation. Backup plans are essential for survival if public reputation is at risk. 
 
4.5 Projecting 
 
In the projecting phase the first thing is to check if a company has its own project model to 
follow. Company members must confirm that technical content, quality, time, and costs are 
managed. Normally an outsider consult or a specialist is needed. Typically they utilize their 
own models that they are used to applying. Below is one example on how to proceed: 
 
- Requirements analysis for business drivers, analysis of costs, business benefits, alter-
native solutions, system vulnerabilities, security requirements, legal and regulatory 
constraints, project planning 
- Definition for designing and modeling the proposed PKI architecture, trust manage-
ment, defining operating requirements, specifying test activities, producing the de-
tailed project plan 
- Operations for definition of the operating procedures and controls, production of the 
Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement 
- Security review, corrective action 
- Integration for system build and test, operator and support training 
- Deployment for installation and validation, acceptance testing 
- Post-deployment for upgrading, operation testing. 
 
PKI projects are complex undertakings that often involve a large number of vendors and ser-
vice providers. These must be carefully controlled in what activities they are taking. For ex-
ample, configuration management must have a clear picture of version control of all operat-
ing system software and PKI component software. Also, Change management must make sure 
that all implication to PKI design is understood. Outside consults and specialists normally cost 
a sizable sum. 
 
Here are some risks that must be controlled in the PKI project: 
- Interoperability with the corporate directory 
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- Identifying and retaining skilled resources 
- Integration with applications 
- Impact upon the existing IT infrastructure 
- Interoperability with other PKI elements like CA and RA 
- Scalability and performance. 
 
4.6 Design and specification 
 
A wide variety of factors affect the design of a PKI. Design must be such as to ensure that it is 
capable of meeting the organization’s instant and future requirements. European payment 
council recommends that ―Asymmetric key pair should be dedicated to one usage for in-
stance: entity authentication, non-repudiation of data, symmetric keys encryption or other‖ 
(European Payments Council.2009. 67). All security needs and certificate requirements for 
company must be researched following before before and after the company makes any deci-
sions: (Microsoft Window Server TechNet Library. 2003.) 
 
- Location of the root certification authorities. 
- Internal versus third-party CAs. 
- Requirements for CA capacity, performance, and scalability. 
- User management structure. 
- Your PKI management model. 
- CA types and roles. 
- Use of hardware cryptographic service providers. 
- Number of CAs required. 
 
CA infrastructures consist of a hierarchy of CAs. The infrastructure’s final authority is called 
root CA. The root CA certifies other certification authorities to publish and manage certifi-
cates within the organization. After these definitions, the project can define roles for any 
additional certification authorities, including who manages them and what trust relationships 
they have with other CAs. These must be defined for specifications: (Microsoft Window Server 
TechNet Library. 2003.) 
 
- Person or team who designates the root CA in the organization.  
- Where the root CA is to be located. 
- Person or team who manages the root CA. 
- Is the root CA role only to certify other certification authorities or also to serve cer-
tificate requests from users. 
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Organizations must define CA capacity, performance and scalability. Companies must know 
how many certifications they need to issue and renew. They must define the lengths of is-
suing CA certificates and number of configurations what client computers must support. 
Hardware and network definitions must be specified also. If the company uses lot of small CAs 
with strategically located CRL distribution points, it reduces the risk that your organization 
might be forced to revoke and reissue all its certificates. This case is current if a large CA is 
compromised. If company uses lot of CAs this might increase administrative overhead. (Micro-
soft Window Server TechNet Library. 2003.) 
 
Companies must also outline network capacity so roles are clear. Network is more vital than 
physical performance limitations. When company is planning server and network environment 
specifications to PKI the company must consider number of CPUs (Central Processing Unit), 
disk performance, number of disks, amount of memory, and hard disk capacity. When compa-
nies define environment they must take into consideration key length and network band-
width. Companies must define PKI group policy. This includes trusted root for groups of com-
puters, certificate trust list and auto enrollment. (Microsoft Window Server TechNet Library. 
2003.) 
 
It is vital to define a PKI management model before company starts process design CA infra-
structure. PKI management model must complement company security management design 
and it gives requirements for roles (appendix 3). Company must remember at specifications 
that single individual cannot compromise PKI services (appendix 3). It is always better to 
spread roles across company. The following tasks must be spread: (Microsoft Window Server 
TechNet Library. 2003.) 
 
- Creating or modifying CAs 
- Managing certificate templates 
- Issuing cross certificates 
- Issuing or revoking user certificates 
- Configuring and viewing audit logs 
 
Company must define CA types and roles. Microsoft Windows Server uses two services. These 
are enterprise and Stand-alone. The difference between these two is that enterprise is inte-
grated into Windows own Active Directory. Company must design also Root CA and Subordi-
nate CAs. Microsoft has built guidelines to design CA (appendix 4). Company must also choose 
CA architecture from three alternatives: simple, enterprise or hybrid. It must also define dif-
ferent CA roles in the architecture. These can be divided, for example, to security classes: 
basic, medium or high. Also firm must define CA naming standard. At this stage company must 
have a plan on whether they need to use third party CA for cross certification requirements. 
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At this stage the company must specificity its CA environment disaster recovery and continui-
ty plans. CRL behavior must be determined. Is CRL list single, multiple or online revocation? 
(Microsoft Window Server TechNet Library. 2003.) 
 
4.7 Product and vendor mapping 
 
The main question is, are PKI services hosted by the company or outsourced. Vendor selection 
must be based on offered functions and those criterions. For example, vendor product com-
ponents supply for different PKI solutions, vendor product flexibility, reputation, financial 
situation, market status and segment, customer references, location, standards what they 
use, support, consulting and development capability, and understanding of the operating 
environment. 
 
The next task for the company is to select product. Mainly this means that company must 
compare their requirements to what the product support. These kind of requirements are PKI 
architecture, product maturity, ability customize, what standards are supported, key and 
certificate management, security management, hardware, network and operating system 
requirements, and product support lifecycle. 
 
Firms can also build their own solutions. What this means is that the company must to main-
tain direct control over its security policies. Also, the company must align its certificate poli-
cy with security policy. Their own solution can be expanded to include additional functionali-
ty and users at relatively little extra cost. But this means also that company manages its own 
certificates and manages software and hardware updates. This requires an in-house dedicated 
staff because project deployment schedule for internal CAs is longer than third-party service. 
Businesses must likewise accept their responsibility for the PKI environment. Furthermore, 
the end customer point of view must be kept in mind. Certification liability must be trusted 
also to the customer. Sometimes cross certification is needed. 
 
Companies can focus on core business for outsourced PKI solutions. The outsource vendor is 
responsible for technology changes and liable for security. Companies can build their trust 
toward their outsource vendor using PKI standards. They do not need hire any specialist to 
host PKI environment. Typically, costs are shared per certificate so costs might turn expen-
sive in a large environment. Quick changes are not possible and environment is not so flexi-
ble. New integrations might prove difficult to do. In the end, the individual business is always 
responsible for security issues to the end customer. Contracts are vital to outsourcing PKI 
services. ITIL (Information Technology Infrastructure Library) has listed what must be taken 
into consideration when outsourcing: (Cazemier, J., Overbeek, P. & Peters, L. 2010. 115) 
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- Protect company assets, including information, software and hardware 
- Determine any compromise of assets 
- Controls to ensure return or destruction of information and assets 
- Reporting structure 
- Change management process 
- Authorization processes 
- Arrangements for security incidents and breaches 
- Audit processes 
- Service continuity requirements 
- Third party subcontractor agreements 
- Termination or agreements  
 
4.8 Service management, operational and administration 
 
In ITIL, the four main functions are service desk, technical management, IT operations man-
agement, and Application management. Technical management, IT operations management 
and Application management contain number of operational activities to ensure service and 
processes. These ensure technology required by delivers and support service is operating ef-
fectively. (Cazemier, J., Overbeek, P. & Peters, L. 2010. 88) 
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Figure 10 Service operations functions  
(Cazemier, J. 2010. 88) 
 
Information security management has responsibility for setting policies, standards and proce-
dures to ensure the protection of the company assets, data, information and IT services. Op-
erational management cannot own security management function. Operational service team 
executes security policies, standards and procedures. It also gives technical assistance and 
does technical security controls. (Cazemier, J., Overbeek, P. & Peters, L. 2010. 89) Opera-
tional requirements are for PKI environment: (Barker, E., Barker, W., Burr ,W. & Polk ,W. and 
Smid, M. 2002. 63) 
 
- Certificate Application  
- Certificate Issuance 
- Certificate Acceptance  
- Certificate Suspension and Revocation 
- Security Audit Procedures 
- Records Archival 
- Key Changeover 
- Compromise and Disaster Recovery 
- CA Termination 
 
Clear guidelines on the operational procedures must be specified so operational teams can 
understand what actions they are required to do and what actions are outside their responsi-
bility. Operational team actions are listed in appendix 5. Regular reviews of services must be 
held between operational and security teams. Annual reviews with the service provider must 
also be held. For the PKI environment few add-ons should be considered. First is the specifi-
cation of the service management criteria required for the PKI. Next involves the definition of 
the operating procedures for the management of the trust services like CA and RA. Last is the 
definition of liability for outsourced certification or registration. 
 
4.9 Policy and standards 
 
Bank for Internal settlements principle 15 defines policies in the following manner: ―Supervi-
sors must be satisfied that banks have in place risk management policies and processes to 
identify, assess, monitor and control or mitigate operational risk. These policies and 
processes should be commensurate with the size and complexity of the bank.‖ (Bank for In-
ternational Settlements. 2006.4). PCI card industry definition of policies reads that ―A strong 
security policy sets the security tone for the whole entity and informs personnel what is ex-
pected of them. All personnel should be aware of the sensitivity of data and their responsibil-
ities for protecting it.‖ (PCI Security Standards Council LLC. 2008.64).   
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Public key infrastructure Certificate Policy (CP) framework rfc3647 is published by Internet 
Engineering Task Force (See Appendix 6). Certificate policy must inform the reader of what 
you have. Certification Practice Statement (CPS) must tell the reader how to use Certificate 
Policy guidelines. Certification Policy is divided nine main points. It is necessary to go through 
each of these main points so that all the subjects of the Certificate Policy are covered. Cer-
tificate Policy functions as a part in the company’s overall security policy. Also some Certifi-
cate Policy issues might be found in other company policies or agreements. Certificate Policy 
must be readable for the readers so they understand what they are reading. 
  
Certificate Policy consists of directions from management. One involves creating a key man-
agement program, next is about establishing its goals, and the third deals with assigning re-
sponsibilities. Security Policy submits matters such as the specific managerial decisions. 
These establish key management infrastructures and the generation, distribution, securing, 
and accounting for keying materials. (Barker, E., Barker, W., Burr ,W. & Polk ,W. and Smid, 
M. 2002.65). This is reason why Security Policy must define the roles, responsibilities and key 
management activities.   
 
Standard is a larger subject to focus on Public Key Infrastructure operations model. Standards 
are more top-level tools for handling Public Key Infrastructure issues. Still, there are always 
good guidelines for to follow. The best known security standard is the International Standar-
dization Organization (ISO) 27000 series. It describes the management system of information 
security. There is no direct connection to PKI but lot of usable guidelines. Other usable ISO 
standards are 13335:2004 management of information and communication technology securi-
ty, ISO 7498-2 OSI Security Architecture and ISO 20000 Service Management. There are also 
models and associations which provide guidelines. One Is the International Security Forum’s 
(ISF) standard of good practice for information security, while another is the Sherwood Busi-
ness Security Architecture (SABSA). The latter model focuses on architecture security, taking 
into consideration all critical functions. There are also the Information System Audit and Con-
trol Association (ISACA) COBIT model, Security Standards Council PCI model, and National 
Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publications. 
 
4.10 Securing the trust base 
 
Securing the trust base is the base of on Certificate policy. PKI requirement is to ensure that 
Certificate Authority, Registration Authority and certificate repository are properly pro-
tected. First is physical security. Company must make sure that Certification Authority and 
certificate repository are housed in a physically secure location. Access to Registration Au-
thorities and Certification Authorities should be controlled by using two factor authentica-
tions.  
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Next is the network security. Services are locating the Certification Authority and certificate 
repository behind a dedicated firewall. This should be configured to pass only LDAP 
(Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) traffic to the repository and certificate management 
traffic to the Certification Authority. PCI model defines network security ―Logging mechan-
isms and the ability to track user activities are critical in preventing, detecting, or minimizing 
the impact of a data compromise. The presence of logs in all environments allows thorough 
tracking, alerting, and analysis when something does go wrong. Determining the cause of a 
compromise is very difficult, if not impossible, without system activity logs.‖ (PCI Security 
Standards Council LLC. 2008.55). 
 
Third in the list is the computer security of the operating system on those machines on which 
the Certification Authority and repository will run. Vulnerability assessment tools must be 
used other ways to support this activity. The PCI rule defines operating system danger as ―Un-
scrupulous individuals use security vulnerabilities to gain privileged access to systems. Many 
of these vulnerabilities are fixed by vendor-provided security patches, which must be in-
stalled by the entities that manage the systems. All critical systems must have the most re-
cently released, appropriate software patches.‖ (PCI Security Standards Council LLC. 
2008.38). 
 
Fourth is intrusion detection. Implement intrusion detection software on the LAN segment 
housing the Certification Authority and certificate repository. Host-based intrusion detection 
software should be placed on the Certification Authority and certificate repository server 
machines. Penetration testing should be conducted on a regular basis and whenever there has 
been any significant change in the computing base.  
 
Fifth is Availability. The certificate repository should be designed for high-availability.  
 
Last is the operational security. Certification Authority administrators should have the highest 
level of security clearance in the company. All relevant logs and alerts should be reviewed on 
a daily basis. 
 
The company must make sure that Security education and awareness activities are carried 
out. PKI users also need to be periodically reminded of the need to protect their private keys.  
Disaster recovery plans must be developed and maintained that detail the steps to be taken 
should a catastrophic event occur. These should specify the precise actions to be taken to 
recover the PKI at an alternative secure location. Particular attention will need to be paid to 
maintaining the level of security that is required to ensure the proper protection of the Certi-
fication Authority. Clear procedures for dealing with compromise or suspected compromise 
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need to be developed, implemented and communicated widely to PKI users, support person-
nel, and help desk staff. 
 
Company must maintain and analyze audit logs for unusual or suspicious events. All significant 
events in the trust base should be recorded in a secure audit log with key events time/date 
stamped and signed to prevent unauthorized changes. Also ensure that the trusted computing 
base is maintained and that any changes are detected, investigated and corrected. Company 
must ensure physical security controls are strictly maintained and that only a limited number 
of known trusted administrators have access to the trust base machines. Company must set 
rules to all visiting personnel ensuring they are escorted at all times and that all actions are 
underwritten, clearly understood and checked. 
 
Incident response guidelines what company should do minimum: 
- Immediate action 
- Impact analysis  
- Root cause analysis 
- Escalation to senior management 
- Communication to staff, senior management and press office 
 
4.11 Deployment 
 
The company must have detailed plan on how to deploy the PKI. Here the first step is the 
schedule rollout. It’s possible to do partial rollout and publish rest of the services, such as 
secure mail function or smart card authentication, later when the business needs these. Next 
phase is the installation of Certification Authorizes. Company must have its CA hierarchy 
ready. After this hierarchy stage and offline root CA must be installed. After this the follow-
ing stage is the publishing of the offline CA certificate and application of CA policy. The Au-
thority Information Access (AIA) and CRL distribution point (CDP) extensions follow after this 
part. The AIA extension specifies where to find the latest certificates for the CA, while the 
CDP extension stipulates where are the newest CRLs. These extensions are issued by that CA 
and ensure that this information is included in every certificate that the CA issues so the cer-
tificate is available to all clients. (Microsoft Window Server TechNet Library. 2003.) 
 
Configuring certificate templates is the next stage. After that Access Control Lists (ACLs) for 
each certificate template control the permissions is needed to request certificate types. Next 
phase is to configure public key group policy and configure CRL Publication. After this the 
company must decide what the default certificate publication period is and ensure applica-
tion reliability because many systems rely on CRL availability. CRL size and cleaning proce-
dures must be on production. One of the central things in the deployment phase is to dele-
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gate CA Administrators so they understand their responsibilities. After this the company can 
configure certificate enrollment and renewal processes and start issuing certificates. (Micro-
soft Window Server TechNet Library. 2003.) 
 
For large deployments a slow, staged rollout in which each stage can be reversed, if neces-
sary, is recommended. The deployment of a PKI can be one of the most time consuming and 
expensive parts of the entire project. Where PKI client software forms part of the solution it 
will be necessary to visit every desktop, laptop and other computing device that needs to 
make use of the PKI. The user base and education and awareness activities must be com-
pleted prior to installing the client software. Where the roll-out actively introduces the user 
immediately into the PKI, following material should be provided to ensure that users fully 
understand the importance of protecting access to their keys and they are aware of how the 
PKI affects their job. Also realize the limitations of the PKI and know where and how to get 
help. 
 
There are six development functions: (Barker, E., Barker, W., Burr ,W. & Polk ,W. and Smid, 
M. 2007. 92) 
- User registration function  
- System initialization function 
- User initialization function 
- Keying material installation function 
- Key establishment function 
- Key registration function 
 
Pre operational phase in user registration function is crucial so that the RA establish appro-
priate procedures for the validation of identity. This might be face to face identification or 
some other strong authentication method. The strength or weakness of a security infrastruc-
ture depend the identification process. System initialization function is to build or configure a 
system for secure operation. User initialization function is about installation of a key at a CA, 
trust parameters, policies, trusted parties, and algorithm preferences. Keying material instal-
lation function is how to set up hardware, system, application, crypto module or devices. Key 
establishment function is the generation and distribution. Key registration function is the 
binding of keying material to information or attributes associated with a particular entity. 
(Barker, E., Barker, W., Burr ,W. & Polk ,W. and Smid, M. 2007. 92) 
 
4.12 Test and release 
 
PCI definition for the testing reads: ―Vulnerabilities are being discovered continually by mali-
cious individuals and researchers, and being introduced by new software. System compo-
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nents, processes, and custom software should be tested frequently to ensure security controls 
continue to reflect a changing environment.‖ (PCI Security Standards Council LLC. 2008.59). 
Tests must be done in a proper way if the Public Key Infrastructure is to be secure and func-
tional. Company should form the quality control points that determine if the project can pro-
ceed or not. Test data is used to determine to check that the system is working correctly. 
This is important in the case of keying material. The Certification Authority signing key should 
also be securely disposed of to ensure all certificates that were signed by it during testing are 
no longer valid. Also, this should assess to what extent the implemented PKI meets the docu-
mented design requirements. The project must at least test the Certification Authority instal-
lations, Registration Authority installations, PKI client software installations and performance. 
 
Unit test Unit testUnit test
Interoperability 
test
System test
Integration testT
im
e
 t
a
b
le
Test data
Operational test
Acceptance test
 
Figure 11 Test process 
 
The project must construct a reliable test schedule before actual testing starts. After this the 
project must generate test data and then the unit testing can begin. After unit tests system 
tests are the next step. Integration tests start when connections to other end points are 
ready. These tests include also interoperability tests. These tests exam CA usability to other 
CAs. After this an operational test must be done in an environment which looks like the pro-
duction environment. Last is the acceptance test. This is a test area where the project needs 
business effort to finalize the version for production. 
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National Institute of Standards and Technology Special has defined testing for the CKMS 
(Cryptographic Key Management Systems):(Barker,E., Branstad,D., Chokhani,S. & Smid,M. 
2010.63) 
 
- Vender Testing 
- Third Party Testing 
- Interoperability Testing 
- Self-Testing 
- Scalability Testing 
- Functional Testing and Security Testing 
- Limitations of Testing 
 
4.13 Education and training 
 
All users must share a clear view of the protection measures they must provide for their pri-
vate signing key. Furthermore, they must always be aware of what they are signing and fully 
understand the purpose and function of the PKI. An example for this is how the new PKI envi-
ronment changes personnel work. With the new environment come new responsibilities for 
the personnel. Normal security issues must be found from Security Practice Statement docu-
ment. 
 
PKI operating personnel education points: 
- the security operating requirements of the PKI 
- the function and purpose of the PKI 
- how to operate the PKI 
- how to resolve day-to-day issues 
- how to recognize potential security issues and escalate them. 
 
AWARENESS TRAINING EDUCATION
Attribute: What How Why
Level: Information Knowledge Insight
Teaching Method: Recognition Skill Understanding
Test Measure:
Media
- Videos
- Newsletters
- Posters
Practical Instruction
- Lecture
Case study workshops
-Hands-on practice
Theoretical Instruction
- Discussion Seminar
- Mackground reading
Impact Timeframe: Short-term Intermediate Long-term
 
Figure 12 Comparative Framework  
(NIST 800-12. 1995. 147) 
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NIST has three separate terms: awareness, training, and education. Awareness supports the 
mission of the company by valuable recourses. From a personnel’s point of view it is merely 
some rules and procedures. In a normal case they ignore those and do not make any sugges-
tions for improving security or recognizing any threats. Training is about teaching the person-
nel such skills that they can perform their works tasks in a more secure way. This means that 
ideally they should know what to do and how to do it in a secure way. Training is divided into 
basic security tasks and more technical security issues. It is effective when tailored to specif-
ic audiences as then the contents can be more detailed and specific. Tellingly, the education 
designed for security professionals often focuses on the particulars of just one or two issues. 
(NIST 800-12. 1995. 147) 
 
Awareness, training, and education boil down to the all-important question of communica-
tion. All three activities are focused on understanding what the interests of the information 
security management mean and to guide personnel and customer toward these interests. 
Normally, changing old processes is difficult for the company personnel who do not like hav-
ing their privileges removed, even when they are not really needed. The personnel need to be 
convinced why the changes are made. This new PKI Awareness, training and education pro-
gram must add company’s normal instructions for the new personnel or new position. (Ca-
zemier, J., Overbeek, P. & Peters, L. 2010. 94) 
 
4.14 Support and maintenance 
 
NIST definitions for support and maintenance form the last three stages of the key manage-
ment lifecycle. These are operational stage, post-operational stage, and destroyed stage. 
Operational stage is divided into four sub phases. First is the normal operational storage func-
tion with device or module storage and immediately accessible storage. Second is the conti-
nuity of operations function. This includes backup storage and key recovery functions. Third is 
the key change function what includes functions re-keying and key updating. Last is the key 
derivation function. (Barker, E., Barker, W., Burr ,W. & Polk ,W. and Smid, M. 2007. 102)  
 
ITIL definition to service operations processes are: (Cazemier, J., Overbeek, P. & Peters, L. 
2010. 77) 
- Event management 
- Request fulfillment 
- Incident management 
- Problem management 
- Access management 
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Event management is a detectable or discernible occurrence that has an impact to service. 
Deviation might cause a service break. It is important that the business is informed when se-
curity events occur. Request fulfillment is a process that deals with service requests. It is 
controlled by the PKI or other policy documents. Incident management is how the company 
uses continuity. These cases are divided into five sub areas: legal issues, broad incident anal-
ysis, estimating damage, restricting unnecessary damage, and restricting the knowledge of 
security incident. (Cazemier, J., Overbeek, P. & Peters, L. 2010. 78) 
 
Problem management aims to find causes to incidents, making it possible to find security 
leaks. Few points must be remembered. First is to keep problem management team on a need 
to know basis. This means that it is better that the team is too small than too large. Also, 
when new findings are located it is important that security solutions do not cause further 
security problems. Access management is about the authorization of the environment and 
documentation. (Cazemier, J., Overbeek, P. & Peters, L. 2010. 85) 
 
Hardware and software must be monitored to ensure it continues to meet the performance 
and reliability requirements of the PKI. Software patches and bug fixes are needed to be eva-
luated beforehand and then installed in a controlled way. Helpdesk for PKI users must be 
single point of contact. Call management procedures must forward the issue to the second 
and third line support functions. This way company can ensure that problems are addressed 
as soon as possible. Helpdesk staff must be trained to recognize scale of security problems so 
they can forward the information to the function responsible. A single 24 x 7 contact point for 
all security-related queries should be established so that PKI users so users can report any 
suspicious activity or key compromise without delay. 
 
4.15 Audit 
 
Bank of International Settlements definition for audit is ―Supervisors must be satisfied that 
banks have in place internal controls that are adequate for the size and complexity of their 
business. These should include clear arrangements for delegating authority and responsibility‖ 
(Bank for International Settlements. 2006.4). Part of the audit management process company 
must define the roles and responsibilities of the users who are involved in the management. 
List of possible users: (European Payments Council. 2010. 9) 
- Business users 
- Help desk / customer support 
- Systems management users 
- Contract management 
- Internal & external auditors 
- Security administrators 
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- Internal investigation teams 
- Computer Security incident response team 
- Law enforcement agencies 
 
Two types of audit must be performed. First is to audit security plans and procedures. These 
must be on the same level as the certification policy. Second audit form is the technical ap-
proach. All critical technical solutions must be audited. These inspections must also be com-
parable to the policies. Both of these audits must be performed periodically as it is specified 
in the certification policy. (Barker, E., Barker, W., Burr ,W. & Polk ,W. and Smid, M. 2007. 
114).  
 
The company in question must make sure at the audit that proper administration and applica-
ble infrastructure controls exist for implementation, maintenance, and usage of private key 
encryption. Also, key management, including generation, maintenance, distribution and expi-
ration, is to be controlled. Company must have evaluation of private key alternative methods 
take into consideration the company position on need for security. The Information Systems 
Audit and Control Association and Foundation published audit steps appendix 7 and question-
naire to PKI environment audit appendix 8. (The Information Systems Audit and Control Asso-
ciation and Foundation. 2001.3) 
 
5 Findings 
 
Business case phase is a regular business case process. This process should come from compa-
ny’s own process environment. There are no specific PKI demands in the business case phase. 
From a security point of view these phases should have their own detailed guide on how to 
estimate what are the costs to security environment. How to estimate what is really needed 
so future projects do not build extra secure or fully automated environments without any 
benefit. 
 
In the analysis of technical requirements the company should follow know standards like ISO 
27000 or PCI. Good example is best practices like appendix 2. It is important to go through all 
in the analysis stage as the company can easily notice if some area, like the physical envi-
ronment, is missing. Normally projects think only for valid environments. There might be si-
milarities and projects can save cost and time. Also, if environment is outsources it helps 
environment deployment. 
 
Governance support like senior management support is vital for the security projects. These 
are persons who can make decisions so projects avoid delays because of lack of decisions. 
Model gives basic knowledge for governance support but this is normally depended on compa-
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ny or project manager. For example, inside project manager has better connections to senior 
management. Sometimes this is a good thing and at other times this is a problem. 
 
Business impact phase needs more detail information how to evaluate real impact. For exam-
ple this phase needs a check list for the actors like customer, personnel, and vendors. There 
is always something what must be taken in the consideration. That is the reason why best 
practice check list is needed. This phase is also related on company sector. Different sectors 
have own demand and needs. 
 
Projecting phase is a standard stage in the projects. This phase is not so important in this 
model. This phase should give more detail information where project manager can find guide-
lines and best practices on how to set up a project. There is good models to follow like the 
PRINCE2 (Project IN Controlled Environment) or PMBOK. Company should have its own model 
what to follow. Some PKI project cases are good to follow a vendor or consult specified 
project model if they are responsible for the project.  
 
Design and specification phase is what to write so an environment can be done. This is more 
technical than others. It is important that technical personnel of the project are participat-
ing. This Microsoft guideline for implementation is enough for the windows environment. I 
assume that other service providers have same kind of best practices what to follow. At this 
phase all business needs must be known by the project design group. These specifications 
should be reviewed with the business. 
 
Product and vendor mapping phase are decisions what service provider or program company 
are using. This phase needs more information example from ITIL. From ITIL project can find 
of processes for finding right product and vendor. For example, there should be specified RFO 
(Request for Order) and RFP (Request for Proposal) processes. This is normally specified in the 
company because it works with all projects. Service management, operational and adminis-
tration phase is fully implemented from ITIL. Maybe some special detail for PKI or security 
can be found. Basically these processes are almost same in all IT sector. Model should follow 
ITIL process steps with PKI information.  
 
The policy and standards phase is more detailed to PKI and security issues. PKI and security 
have their own security policies and practice statement models what to follow. During this 
phase it is always important to remember that companies have their own security policies 
what they must follow. 
 
Securing the trust base phase tells company what was the PKI policy state because this phase 
is based on that. In this phase all the PKI policy stages must be checked so that all is done as 
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in the defined policy. PKI policy is an inclusive guide, ranging from technical to legal issues. 
So this phase needs time to pass. Deployment phase is about the technical issues. In this 
phase all plans are built to use. It is very important to follow specifications so all is done in 
the right order and in the right way. Normally in this phase it is noticed whether something is 
not planned. These new specification add-ons must be described and approved by the man-
agement. Also it is import calculate new costs. 
 
Test and release phase is where project needs more hands on personnel because there are 
lots of different tasks. Normal situation a company has its own test and release processes. If 
not company should follow some known standard or best practice like ITIL. ITIL has already 
solved basic problems with this phase. This implementation model should follow more ITIL 
process. These basic ITIL processes need all kind of authorities. 
 
Education and training phase is easiest to drop out from the plans. Yet it is still an important 
part. This phase is for the new users and for the rest of the company to know what this 
project focuses on. Company should have its own security education and training program. 
This should be only one part of that. Project has massive work to do if company does not have 
any program of its own. This must be taken care of in the project time table. 
 
Support and maintenance phase is important for continuity. Company should have already 
working support and maintenance processes. This is only for PKI implementation to that. Also 
this is lighter if services are outsourced because of some services are provided by the vendor. 
Company should follow ITIL processes if company does not have already these processes on 
place. During this phase the company must consider whether the PKI services are open always 
or can the hours be limited to business hours. 
 
The audit phase is compulsory for some sectors. This means that company should have an 
audit process on place like specification audits and environment audits. Normally these are 
added to company’s own project processes. During the audit phase the company should use 
COBIT models. Company separate full COBIT implementation from project work. 
 
This model phases is not same operational level. Some phases are light business decisions and 
so are detailed technical assignments. Model needs some kind of estimation about the timet-
able. Every phase should have its own duration estimate. Also, the model needs an estimate 
on what phases can be done at the same time and what phases are depended on each other. 
It also needs actors. Every phase should have information concerning who is responsible for 
that phase and who must participate in that phase. Project manager carries the overall re-
sponsibility but every phase needs its own responsible person such as the audit risk manager 
or for technical environment setups the technical architect. 
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6 Conclusions 
 
My thesis has developed a particular artifact: a Public Key Infrastructure operations model. 
This model offers first steps on what must be done in a Public Key Infrastructure project. It 
also gives a partial answer on how to develop better PKI services. So time and money is saved 
and Public Key Infrastructure services are more secure. Results are from a real Public Key 
Infrastructure project but these kinds of projects are comparable with one another. 
 
Public Key Infrastructure operations model should build be based on some known standard or 
best practice. Most suitable are the base ITIL with COBIT extensions. This is the case especial-
ly when ITIL is used in the other projects. When the base model is ready that can be eva-
luated by the CMMI (Capability Maturity Model Integration) so company knows what the model 
performance is. After this, the model should have its own security extensions. Last comes the 
Public Key Infrastructure extensions to operations model. A model without generalizability is 
not reusable. Public Key Infrastructure is very usable in various situations. This is one more 
reason why the base model should be based on some known model. 
 
The PKI product provides technical best practices guides to companies like Microsoft devel-
opment guide to Windows server 2003. But full usable best practice model is not readily 
available. There is always some kind of risk in the use of best practice models or standards. 
David Lacey mentions at his article ―We have a dangerous herd mentality setting in, to the 
point that best practices can now be considered dangerous. Whether it’s methodologies, con-
trol descriptions or technologies, we are locked into a dangerous monoculture which is lead-
ing to a growing systemic risk.‖ (Lacey, D. 2011) 
 
7 Further research 
 
Future research could involve comparing Public Key Infrastructure operations model to ITIL 
models or to some other widely used model. Researchers should build a new base for the Pub-
lic Key Infrastructure operations model following the comparisons. This model issue is better 
divided into smaller phases so it is easier to develop. Good example for next step develop-
ment is an own check list to every phase. Model of this kind research could use PCI standard. 
 
The model must be updated regularly because Public Key Infrastructure is constantly develop-
ing. There comes new ways to use the environment or the technique changes. Basically, secu-
rity is going forward all the time. This means that model updating process is needed. This 
could be implementation from ITIL or COBIT. 
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Appendix 1 High lever summary of processes (PMBOK guide. 2004. 42) 
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Appendix 2 Key Management Inserts for Security Plan Templates  (Barker, E., Barker, W., Burr 
,W. & Polk ,W. and Smid, M. 2002.72) 
 
1. Information System Name/Title  
• Unique identifier and name given to the system.  
2. Information System Categorization  
• Identify the appropriate FIPS 199 categorization.  
3. Information System Owner  
• Name, title, agency, address, email address, and phone number of person who owns the 
system.  
4. Authorizing Official  
• Name, title, agency, address, email address, and phone number of the senior manage-
ment official designated as the authorizing official.  
5. Other Designated Contacts  
• List other key personnel, if applicable; include their title, address, email address, and 
phone number.  
6. Assignment of Security Responsibility  
• Name, title, address, email address, and phone number of person who is responsible for 
the security of the system.  
7. Information System Operational Status  
• Indicate the operational status of the system. If more than one status is selected, list 
which part of the system is covered under each status.  
8. Information System Type  
• Indicate if the system is a major application or a general support system.  
9. General System Description/Purpose  
• Describe the function or purpose of the system and the information processes.  
10. System Environment  
• Provide a general description of the technical system. Include the primary hardware, 
software, and communications equipment.  
• Key management-specific information that needs to be included in this section includes 
identification of any cryptographic mechanisms employed (including key variable 
sources) and the location of stored and archived cryptographic key variables.  
11. System Interconnections/Information Sharing  
• List interconnected systems and system identifiers (if appropriate), provide the system, 
name, organization, system type (major application or general support system), indi-
cate if there is an ISA/MOU/MOA on file, date of agreement to interconnect, FIPS 199 
category, C&A status, and the name of the authorizing official.  
12. Related Laws/Regulations/Policies  
• List any laws or regulations that establish specific requirements for the confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability of the data in the system.  
13. Minimum Security Controls 
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• Provide a thorough description of how the minimum controls in the applicable baseline 
are being implemented or planned to be implemented. The controls should be de-
scribed by control family and indicate whether it is a system control, hybrid control, 
common control, scoping guidance is applied, or a compensating control is being 
used.  
• Key management-specific information that needs to be included in this section includes: 
key archiving and recovery procedures in support of recovery of encrypted files; con-
trols for validation of digital signature and other integrity keying materials (certifica-
tion authority and controls for determining completeness/correctness); key manage-
ment procedures for key generation, distribution, storage, and disposal; and applica-
ble cryptographic standards and guidelines for all cryptographic mechanisms em-
ployed. This information may be included in a key management appendix.  
14. Information System Security Plan Completion Date  
• Enter the completion date of the plan.  
15. Information System Security Plan Approval Date  
• Enter the date the system security plan was approved and indicate if the approval do-
cumentation is attached or on file.  
16. Key Management 
1. Identification of the Keying Material Manager (The keying material manager 
should report directly to the organization’s chief executive officer, chief opera-
tions executive, or chief information systems officer. The keying material manag-
er is a key employee who should have been determined to have the capabilities 
and trustworthiness commensurate with responsibility for maintaining the author-
ity and integrity of all formal electronic transactions and the confidentiality of all 
information that is sufficiently sensitive to warrant cryptographic protection.)  
2. Identification of the management entity(ies) responsible for Certification Au-
thority (CA) and Registration Authority (RA) functions and interactions. (Where 
applicable: where public key cryptography is employed, either the keying materi-
al manager or his/her immediate superior should be designated as the organiza-
tion’s manager responsible for Certification Authority and Registration Authority 
functions.)  
3. Key Management Organization (Identification of job titles, roles, and/or individu-
als responsible for the following functions:)  
a. Key generation or acquisition;  
b. Agreements with partner organizations regarding cross certification of 
keying material;  
c. Key distribution and revocation structure design and management,  
d. Establishment of cryptoperiods;  
e. Distribution of and accounting for keying material;  
f. Protection of secret and private keys and related materials;  
g. Emergency and routine revocation of keying material;  
h. Auditing of keying material and related records;  
i. Destruction of revoked or expired keys;  
j. Key recovery;  
k. Compromise recovery;  
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l. Contingency planning;  
m. Disciplinary consequences for the willful or negligent mishandling of 
keying material; and  
n. Generation, approval, and maintenance of key management practices 
statements.  
4. Key Management Structure (Description of key certification, distribution and revoca-
tion trees for encryption, signature, and other cryptographic processes implemented 
within the organization. Description of procedures for modifying the trees and for es-
tablishing cryptoperiods.)  
5. Key Management Procedures  
a. Key Generation (Brief description of the procedures to be followed for key 
generation. This section includes reference to applicable standards and guide-
lines. Some procedures may be presented by reference. Note that not all or-
ganizations that employ cryptography will necessarily generate keying ma-
terial.)  
b. Key Acquisition (Identification of source(s) of keying material. Description of 
ordering procedures and examples of any forms employed in ordering keying 
material.)  
c. Cross Certification Agreements (Description of cross certification procedures 
and examples of any forms employed in establishing and/or implementing 
cross certification agreements.)  
d. Distribution of and Accounting for Keying Material (Description of procedures 
and forms associated with requests for keying material, acknowledgement 
and disposition of the requests, receipting for keying material, creating and 
maintaining keying material inventories, reporting destruction of keying ma-
terial, and reporting acquisition or loss of keying material under exceptional 
circumstances.)  
e. Emergency and Routine Revocation of Keying Material (Description of rules 
and procedures for the revocation of keying material under both routine and 
exceptional circumstances, such as notice of unauthorized access to opera-
tional keying material.)  
f. Protection of Secret and Private Keys and Related Materials (Methods and 
procedures employed to protect keying material under various circumstances, 
such as pre-operational, operational, revoked.)  
g. Destruction of Revoked or Expired keys (Procedures and guidelines identify-
ing circumstances, responsibilities, and methods for destruction of keying ma-
terial.)  
h. Auditing of Keying Material and Related Records (Description of circums-
tances, responsibilities, and methods for auditing of keying material.)  
i. Key Recovery (Specification of circumstances and process for authorizing key 
recovery and identification of guidelines and procedures for key recovery op-
erations.)  
j. Compromise Recovery (Procedures from exposure of sensitive keying material 
to unauthorized entities.)  
k. Disciplinary Actions (Specification of consequences for willful or negligent mi-
shandling of keying material.)  
l. Change Procedures (Specification of procedures for effecting changes to key 
procedures.)  
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Appendix 3 PKI roles and actions - Microsoft server 2003. (Microsoft Window Server TechNet 
Library. 2003.) 
 
PKI Roles 
PKI Administra-
tive Role  Description  
Windows Server 2003 Administrative 
Role  
PKI Administrator Configures, maintains, and 
renews the CA.  
User 
Backup Operator Performs system backup 
and recovery. 
Backup Operator on the server on 
which the CA is running 
Audit Manager Configures, views, and 
maintains audit logs.  
Local Administrator on the server on 
which the CA is running 
Key Recovery 
Manager 
Requests retrieval of a pri-
vate key stored by the ser-
vice. 
User 
Certificate Man-
ager 
Approves certificate 
enrollment and revocation 
requests. 
User 
User Manager Manages users and their 
associated information. 
Account Operators (or person dele-
gated to create user accounts in Active 
Directory) 
Enrollee Requests certificates form 
the CA 
Authenticated Users 
 
PKI roles actions 
Action  Enrollee  
CA 
Admin  
Certificate 
Manager  
Audit 
Manager  
Backup 
Operator  
Local 
Server 
Admin  
Install a CA            
Configure a CA           
Policy and exit 
module configura-
tion 
           
Stop/start service           
Change configura-
tion 
           
Assign user roles            
Establish user ac-
counts 
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Maintain user ac-
counts 
          
Configure profiles           
Renew CA keys            
Define key recov-
ery agent(s) 
           
Define officer roles            
Enable role separa-
tion 
           
Issue/Approve cer-
tificates 
           
Deny certificates            
Revoke certificates            
Unrevoke certifi-
cates 
           
Renew certificates            
Enable, publish, or 
configure CRL 
schedule 
           
Configure audit 
parameters 
          
Audit logs           
Back up system           
Restore system           
Read CA proper-
ties, CRL 
           
Request certificate            
Read CA database         
Read CA configura-
tion information 
        
Read issued, Re-
voked, pending 
certificates 
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Appendix 4 Microsoft guidelines to design CA (Microsoft Window Server TechNet Library. 
2003.) 
 Do you require more than one CA? If you are only supporting a single application and 
location, and if 100 percent availability of the CA is not critical, you might be able to 
use a single CA. Otherwise, you probably require at least one root and multiple sub-
ordinate CAs. 
 If you need more than one CA, how many root CAs do you require? Generally, it is 
recommended that you have only one root CA as a single point of trust. This is be-
cause significant cost and effort is required to protect a root CA from compromise. 
With multiple root CAs, root maintenance becomes much more difficult. 
However, organizations with a decentralized security administration model, such as 
corporations with multiple, largely independent business units and no strong central 
administrative body, might require more than one root CA. 
 How many intermediate or policy CAs do you need? 
 How many issuing CAs or RAs do you need?  
The number of intermediate and issuing CAs that you deploy depends on the following 
factors: 
 Usage. Certificates can be issued for a number of purposes (for example, secure e-
mail, network authentication, and so on). Each of these uses might involve differ-
ent issuing policies. Using separate CAs provides a basis for administering each pol-
icy separately. 
 Organizational or geographic divisions. You must have different policies for is-
suing certificates, depending on the role of an entity or its physical location in the 
organization. You can create separate subordinate CAs to administer these poli-
cies. 
 Distribution of the certificate load. You can deploy multiple issuing CAs to distri-
bute the certificate load to meet site, network, and server requirements. For ex-
ample, if network links between sites are slow or discontinuous, you might need to 
place issuing CAs at each site to meet Certificate Services performance and usabili-
ty requirements. 
 The need for flexible configuration. You can tailor the CA environment (key 
strength, physical protection, protection against network attacks, and so on) to 
provide a balance between security and usability. For example, you can renew 
keys and certificates more frequently for the intermediate and issuing CAs that are 
at high risk for compromise, without requiring a change to established root trust 
relationships. Also, when you use more than one subordinate CA, you can turn off a 
subsection of the CA hierarchy without affecting established root trust relation-
ships or the rest of the hierarchy. 
 The need for redundant services. If one enterprise CA fails, redundancy makes it 
possible for another issuing CA to provide users with uninterrupted service.  
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Appendix 5 Operational team actions 
 
- Registering users 
- Authorising and performing revocations 
- Maintaining root keys of CAs and RAs 
- Handling recovery from key loss 
- Regularly checking operating system logs for signs of failure, 
- Problems, or suspicious events 
- Escalating suspicious events 
- Dealing with technical queries on the PKI software 
- Monitoring the performance of key servers 
- Applying patches and bug-fixes 
- Managing the file store and checking quotas 
- Taking backups and holding these in a secure location 
- Identifying potential problems and investigating them 
- Liaising with PKI software vendors and other third parties 
- Resolve issues 
- Maintaining general secure services 
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Appendix 6 Public key infrastructure policy framework rfc3647 (Chokhani, S., Ford,W., Sa-
bett, R., Merrill,C. & Wu,S. 2003.) 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
   1.1 Overview 
   1.2 Document name and identification 
   1.3 PKI participants 
   1.3.1 Certification authorities 
   1.3.2 Registration authorities 
   1.3.3 Subscribers 
   1.3.4 Relying parties 
   1.3.5 Other participants 
   1.4 Certificate usage 
   1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses 
   1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses 
   1.5 Policy administration 
   1.5.1 Organization administering the        
document 
   1.5.2 Contact person 
   1.5.3 Person determining CPS suitability 
for the policy 
   1.5.4 CPS approval procedures 
   1.6 Definitions and acronyms 
2. PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RE-
SPONSIBILITIES 
   2.1 Repositories 
   2.2 Publication of certification informa-
tion 
   2.3 Time or frequency of publication 
   2.4 Access controls on repositories 
3. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION  
   3.1 Naming 
   3.1.1 Types of names 
   3.1.2 Need for names to be meaningful 
   3.1.3 Anonymity or pseudonymity of 
subscribers 
   3.1.4 Rules for interpreting various name 
forms 
   3.1.5 Uniqueness of names 
   3.1.6 Recognition, authentication, and 
role of trademarks 
   3.2 Initial identity validation 
   3.2.1 Method to prove possession of pri-
vate key 
   3.2.2 Authentication of organization 
identity 
   3.2.3 Authentication of individual identi-
ty 
   3.2.4 Non-verified subscriber information 
   3.2.5 Validation of authority 
   3.2.6 Criteria for interoperation 
   3.3 Identification and authentication for 
re-key requests 
   3.3.1 Identification and authentication 
for routine re-key 
   3.3.2 Identification and authentication 
for re-key after revocation 
   3.4 Identification and authentication for 
revocation request 
4. CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATION-
AL REQUIREMENTS 
   4.1 Certificate Application 
   4.1.1 Who can submit a certificate ap-
plication 
   4.1.2 Enrollment process and responsibil-
ities 
   4.2 Certificate application processing 
   4.2.1 Performing identification and au-
thentication functions 
   4.2.2 Approval or rejection of certificate 
applications 
   4.2.3 Time to process certificate appli-
cations 
   4.3 Certificate issuance 
   4.3.1 CA actions during certificate is-
suance 
   4.3.2 Notification to subscriber by the 
CA of issuance of certificate 
   4.4 Certificate acceptance 
   4.4.1 Conduct constituting certificate 
acceptance 
   4.4.2 Publication of the certificate by 
the CA 
   4.4.3 Notification of certificate issuance 
by the CA to other entities 
   4.5 Key pair and certificate usage 
   4.5.1 Subscriber private key and certifi-
cate usage 
   4.5.2 Relying party public key and certif-
icate usage 
   4.6 Certificate renewal 
   4.6.1 Circumstance for certificate re-
newal 
   4.6.2 Who may request renewal 
   4.6.3 Processing certificate renewal 
requests 
   4.6.4 Notification of new certificate 
issuance to subscriber 
   4.6.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of 
a renewal certificate 
   4.6.6 Publication of the renewal certifi-
cate by the CA 
   4.6.7 Notification of certificate issuance 
by the CA to other entities 
   4.7 Certificate re-keys 
   4.7.1 Circumstance for certificate re-
keys 
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   4.7.2 Who may request certification of a 
new public key 
   4.7.3 Processing certificate re-keying 
requests 
   4.7.4 Notification of new certificate 
issuance to subscriber 
   4.7.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of 
a re-keyed certificate 
   4.7.6 Publication of the re-keyed certifi-
cate by the CA 
   4.7.7 Notification of certificate issuance 
by the CA to other entities 
   4.8 Certificate modification 
   4.8.1 Circumstance for certificate mod-
ification 
   4.8.2 Who may request certificate mod-
ification 
   4.8.3 Processing certificate modification 
requests 
   4.8.4 Notification of new certificate 
issuance to subscriber 
   4.8.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of 
modified certificate 
   4.8.6 Publication of the modified certifi-
cate by the CA 
   4.8.7 Notification of certificate issuance 
by the CA to other entities 
   4.9 Certificate revocation and suspen-
sion 
   4.9.1 Circumstances for revocation 
   4.9.2 Who can request revocation 
   4.9.3 Procedure for revocation request 
   4.9.4 Revocation request grace period 
   4.9.5 Time within which CA must process 
the revocation request 
   4.9.6 Revocation checking requirement 
for relying parties 
   4.9.7 CRL issuance frequency (if applica-
ble) 
   4.9.8 Maximum latency for CRLs (if ap-
plicable) 
   4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking 
availability 
   4.9.10 On-line revocation checking re-
quirements 
   4.9.11 other forms of revocation adver-
tisements available 
   4.9.12 Special requirements re key com-
promise 
   4.9.13 Circumstances for suspension 
   4.9.14 Who can request suspension 
   4.9.15 Procedure for suspension request 
   4.9.16 Limits on suspension period 
   4.10 Certificate status services 
   4.10.1 Operational characteristics 
   4.10.2 Service availability 
   4.10.3 Optional features 
   4.11 End of subscription 
   4.12 Key escrow and recovery 
   4.12.1 Key escrow and recovery policy 
and practices 
   4.12.2 Session key encapsulation and 
recovery policy and practices 
5. FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERA-
TIONAL CONTROLS 
   5.1 Physical controls 
   5.1.1 Site location and construction 
   5.1.2 Physical access 
   5.1.3 Power and air conditioning 
   5.1.4 Water exposures 
   5.1.5 Fire prevention and protection 
   5.1.6 Media storage 
   5.1.7 Waste disposal 
   5.1.8 Off-site backup 
   5.2 Procedural controls 
   5.2.1 Trusted roles 
   5.2.2 Number of persons required per 
task 
   5.2.3 Identification and authentication 
for each role 
   5.2.4 Roles requiring separation of duties 
   5.3 Personnel controls 
   5.3.1 Qualifications, experience, and 
clearance requirements 
   5.3.2 Background check procedures 
   5.3.3 Training requirements 
   5.3.4 Retraining frequency and require-
ments 
   5.3.5 Job rotation frequency and se-
quence 
   5.3.6 Sanctions for unauthorized actions 
   5.3.7 Independent contractor require-
ments 
   5.3.8 Documentation supplied to person-
nel 
   5.4 Audit logging procedures 
   5.4.1 Types of events recorded 
   5.4.2 Frequency of processing log 
   5.4.3 Retention period for audit log 
   5.4.4 Protection of audit log 
   5.4.5 Audit log backup procedures 
   5.4.6 Audit collection system (internal 
vs. external) 
   5.4.7 Notification to event-causing sub-
ject 
   5.4.8 Vulnerability assessments 
   5.5 Records archival 
   5.5.1 Types of records archived 
   5.5.2 Retention period for archive 
   5.5.3 Protection of archive 
   5.5.4 Archive backup procedures 
   5.5.5 Requirements for time-stamping of 
records 
   5.5.6 Archive collection system (internal 
or external) 
   5.5.7 Procedures to obtain and verify 
archive information 
   5.6 Key changeover 
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   5.7 Compromise and disaster recovery 
   5.7.1 Incident and compromise handling 
procedures 
   5.7.2 Computing resources, software, 
and/or data are corrupted 
   5.7.3 Entity private key compromise 
procedures 
   5.7.4 Business continuity capabilities 
after a disaster 
   5.8 CA or RA termination 
6. TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS 
   6.1 Key pair generation and installation 
   6.1.1 Key pair generation 
   6.1.2 Private key delivery to subscriber 
   6.1.3 Public key delivery to certificate 
issuer 
   6.1.4 CA public key delivery to relying 
parties 
   6.1.5 Key sizes 
   6.1.6 Public key parameters generation 
and quality checking 
   6.1.7 Key usage purposes (as per X.509 
v3 key usage field) 
   6.2 Private Key Protection and Crypto-
graphic Module Engineering 
   Controls 
   6.2.1 Cryptographic module standards 
and controls 
   6.2.2 Private key (n out of m) multi-
person control 
   6.2.3 Private key escrow 
   6.2.4 Private key backup 
   6.2.5 Private key archival 
   6.2.6 Private key transfer into or from a 
cryptographic module 
   6.2.7 Private key storage on crypto-
graphic module 
   6.2.8 Method of activating private key 
   6.2.9 Method of deactivating private key 
   6.2.10 Method of destroying private key 
   6.2.11 Cryptographic Module Rating 
   6.3 Other aspects of key pair manage-
ment 
   6.3.1 Public key archival 
   6.3.2 Certificate operational periods and 
key pair usage periods 
   6.4 Activation data 
   6.4.1 Activation data generation and 
installation 
   6.4.2 Activation data protection 
   6.4.3 Other aspects of activation data 
   6.5 Computer security controls 
   6.5.1 Specific computer security tech-
nical requirements 
   6.5.2 Computer security rating 
   6.6 Life cycle technical controls 
   6.6.1 System development controls 
   6.6.2 Security management controls 
   6.6.3 Life cycle security controls 
   6.7 Network security controls 
   6.8 Time-stamping 
7. CERTIFICATE, CRL, AND OCSP PRO-
FILES 
   7.1 Certificate profile 
   7.1.1 Version number(s) 
   7.1.2 Certificate extensions 
   7.1.3 Algorithm object identifiers 
   7.1.4 Name forms 
   7.1.5 Name constraints 
   7.1.6 Certificate policy object identifier 
   7.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints exten-
sion 
   7.1.8 Policy qualifiers syntax and seman-
tics 
   7.1.9 Processing semantics for the criti-
cal Certificate Policies extension 
   7.2 CRL profile 
   7.2.1 Version number(s) 
   7.2.2 CRL and CRL entry extensions 
   7.3 OCSP profile 
   7.3.1 Version number(s) 
   7.3.2 OCSP extensions 
8. COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER AS-
SESSMENTS 
   8.1 Frequency or circumstances of as-
sessment 
   8.2 Identity/qualifications of assessor 
   8.3 Assessor's relationship to assessed 
entity 
   8.4 Topics covered by assessment 
   8.5 Actions taken as a result of deficien-
cy 
   8.6 Communication of results 
9. OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS 
   9.1 Fees 
   9.1.1 Certificate issuance or renewal 
fees 
   9.1.2 Certificate access fees 
   9.1.3 Revocation or status information 
access fees 
   9.1.4 Fees for other services 
   9.1.5 Refund policy 
   9.2 Financial responsibility 
   9.2.1 Insurance coverage 
   9.2.2 Other assets 
   9.2.3 Insurance or warranty coverage for 
end-entities 
   9.3 Confidentiality of business informa-
tion 
   9.3.1 Scope of confidential information 
   9.3.2 Information not within the scope of 
confidential information 
   9.3.3 Responsibility to protect confiden-
tial information 
   9.4 Privacy of personal information 
   9.4.1 Privacy plan 
   9.4.2 Information treated as private 
   9.4.3 Information not deemed private 
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   9.4.4 Responsibility to protect private 
information 
   9.4.5 Notice and consent to use private 
information 
   9.4.6 Disclosure pursuant to judicial or 
administrative process 
   9.4.7 Other information disclosure cir-
cumstances 
   9.5 Intellectual property rights 
   9.6 Representations and warranties 
   9.6.1 CA representations and warranties 
   9.6.2 RA representations and warranties 
   9.6.3 Subscriber representations and 
warranties 
   9.6.4 Relying party representations and 
warranties 
   9.6.5 Representations and warranties of 
other participants 
   9.7 Disclaimers of warranties 
   9.8 Limitations of liability 
   9.9 Indemnities 
   9.10 Term and termination 
   9.10.1 Term 
   9.10.2 Termination 
   9.10.3 Effect of termination and survival 
   9.11 Individual notices and communica-
tions with participants 
   9.12 Amendments 
   9.12.1 Procedure for amendment 
   9.12.2 Notification mechanism and pe-
riod 
   9.12.3 Circumstances under which OID 
must be changed 
   9.13 Dispute resolution provisions 
   9.14 Governing law 
   9.15 Compliance with applicable law 
   9.16 Miscellaneous provisions 
   9.16.1 Entire agreement 
   9.16.2 Assignment 
   9.16.3 Severability 
   9.16.4 Enforcement (attorneys' fees and 
waiver of rights) 
   9.16.5 Force Majeure 
   9.17 Other provisions 
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Appendix 7 Audit steps (The Information Systems Audit and Control Association & Foundation. 
2001. 3) 
 
A. Prior Audit/Examination Report Follow-Up 
Review prior report and verify completion of any agreed-upon corrections. Note remaining 
deficiencies 
B. Preliminary Audit Steps 
Obtain: 
-Organization chart 
-Information architecture model for the organization 
-Data classification policy 
-Network infrastructure documentation 
-Inventory of operating systems, applications, and operating systems impacting classified data 
-Specifications of encryption tool(s) 
-Understanding of external requirements (consider international encryption laws) 
Obtain or perform risk assessment on the information need for encryption 
Obtain infrastructure software acquisition procedures 
Obtain maintenance history of all encryption tools in use 
C. Detailed Audit Steps 
 Planning  
Identify the security responsibilities within the organization.  
Determine the level of involvement in the encryption processes by the security staff 
Review the data requirements for encryption for the e-commerce environment 
Review the regulatory requirements for encryption within the country, industry and organiza-
tion and determine level of compliance 
Determine level of risk existing considering the level of encryption implementation status. 
 Identify acceptable risk and determine if any residual risk exceeds the acceptable level  
Review the decision process for selection of symmetrical (private key) usage 
Review the tools selection process relative to compatibility with existing technologies 
Acquisition, Implementation, Maintenance of Encryption 
Review the acquisition process by which the encryption either has been or will be obtained, 
and determine validity to needs requirements 
Review the implementation procedures for encryption tools 
Determine access controls over keys during the acquisition/development process 
Review the change control processes over infrastructure software (encryption tools) 
Review the inventory of systems, applications and operating systems using (or to use) this 
encryption technique 
Assess effectiveness of the encryption output compliance to external regulations and organi-
zational policies 
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Key Management 
Determine the access over keys is appropriate 
Review the processes by which keys are/will be disseminated, maintained and cancelled 
Review the key’s expiration process 
Miscellaneous 
Review control around meta-data over keys, key management, encryption processes and re-
lated infrastructure resources 
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Appendix 8 PKI Questionnaire (The Information Systems Audit and Control Association & Foun-
dation. 2001. 7) 
 
General 
 
Have all items from prior audits been cleared? 
Is there an information architecture model that reflects current business needs? 
Does the information architecture model support PKI data requirements? 
Are sufficient policies in place and communicated to define data/information as an asset? 
 
Either by policy or precedent, is information required to have the following characteristics: 
- Efficiency? 
- Effectiveness? 
- Integrity? 
- Availability? 
- Confidentiality? 
- Compliance?  
- Reliability? 
 
Is there a risk measure performed on an organizational need for encryption? 
Has a concept of acceptable risk been adopted? 
Is there a compliance ―watch‖ function? 
Does the current hardware infrastructure support the PKI plan? 
Does the current software infrastructure support the PKI data requirements? 
If the current infrastructure does not support the PKI plan, are there sufficient hardware and 
software planning initiatives that will provide the appropriate support to obtain the necessary 
tools and will not present unacceptable risk? 
 
Planning 
 
Is there an IT security function involved in security tool recommendations? 
 
Are there detailed procedures for private key management? 
Do they include: 
 - Generation? 
 - Dissemination? 
 - Implementation? 
 - Expiration? 
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Do the current or planned encryption tools work with existing infrastructure? 
 
Acquisition, Implementation, Maintenance of Encryption 
 
Do current tools meet all requirements? 
 
Do all systems that require encryption use it? 
Do infrastructure programs (encryption) follow established change control procedures? 
Are encryption practices compliant with all applicable regulatory entities? 
 
Key Management 
 
Are appropriate controls in place over encryption keys? 
